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REPORT DATE (DD-
Dieppe will show that there were indeed some successes by the Allies on that fateful day and that lessons learned from Dieppe carried over to history's largest amphibious assault on 6 June 1944.
THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE: SPRING 1942
The Allied situation in the spring of 1942 was grim. The Germans had penetrated deep into Russia, the British Eighth Army in North Africa had been forced back into Egypt and in Western Europe, the Allied forces faced the Germans across the English Channel.
1 German U-bottom of the sea while Joseph Stalin was demanding that the Allies open a second front in the West to relieve the Russians from the German onslaught. Strategically, the Allies understood the dire consequences should Russia succumb to the Germans in the East. A negotiated settlement and the shift of German forces to the West, would at the least, extend the war for several more years. Great Britain's reaction since the fall of France in 1940 had been to conduct a series of small intelligence-gathering and harassing raids along the coast of France and Norway, none of which achieved any significant military objective. These raids, some as small as several individual commandos, seemed to raise morale in Britain and were intended to show the Nazis that Allied forces could return to the continent whenever it suited them.
In Nazaire, France. The plan for Operation CHARIOT was to breach the harbor defenses and ram an obsolete American Lend-Lease destroyer, the HMS Campbelltown, loaded with five tons of high explosives into the locks that controlled water flow into the dry dock area.
Accomplishing this would destroy the U-boat pens, a key component of the St. Nazaire port facilities. While the latter portion of the raid was taking place, British commandos would disembark and destroy the pumping facilities in the port. The force successfully accomplished its mission, however at great cost in personnel. Of the approximately 300 plus commandos who went ashore, 109 were captured, half being wounded. Another 100 commandos made it back to the ship safely, but half of these were also wounded. The HMS Campbelltown, which was configured with a time fuse, exploded the following day killing 380 Germans, including 60 officers.
5
In retrospect, the St. Nazaire raid served two purposes: first, it dealt a severe blow to the The second purpose of the St. Nazaire raid gave the Allies the impetus to continue planning future raids on ports where practical. The results seemed to indicate that an attack on a defended port was in fact possible and would be successful given the right circumstances.
Because landing craft of any type for an invasion were in short supply, and would be for the foreseeable future, another assault on a port had a definite appeal to Combined Operations
Command. Much more needed to be learned concerning these operations. One of the "raiding programs" scheduled raids called for a simultaneous assault on six ports stretching from Calais to Boulogne. This quite naturally called for much more experience in amphibious assaults and soon, studies were initiated to examine likely candidates for the next raid. The complete destruction of the facility at St. Nazaire and the resultant propaganda benefits seemed to overshadow the fact that casualties sustained were not insignificant and much stock was placed in the belief that if surprise and shock effect were present, future raids on a port might provide the logistical lodgment needed for a large-scale assault on the continent. St. Nazaire by most accounts was chalked up as a success, however the Allies needed to know much more about
German defenses and concurrent with the raiding program, they began to discuss even bolder, Montgomery also became involved in the planning aspect of RUTTER, and as such would come to be responsible for one of the most debated issues surrounding the Dieppe raid: the decision to incorporate a "frontal assault" in the plan. Upon choosing Dieppe as the next location for a raid, the COHQ planners proposed double flank attacks, with a parachute/glider operation to the rear of Dieppe to seal off the town and destroy the coastal batteries. The "Two-Tide operation,"
an operation in which the tide would come in and go out twice, would include approximately seven battalions of troops and commandos plus a battalion of tanks to be landed six miles to the West of Dieppe. These forces would move toward the airborne forces and consolidate at the port. Montgomery disagreed forcefully with this course of action. He rejected the "flanks only"
plan on the ground that there would be no time and too many obstacles for the tanks to cover the distance between flank-landing beaches and the port before the Germans could summon overwhelming reinforcements. "To assault and capture a port quickly, he said, both troops and tanks would have to go in over the main beaches confronting the town, relying on heavy bombardment and surprise to neutralize the defenses." 10 Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett being Naval officers, felt it was not their place to argue against an Army officer, certainly not one with the growing reputation of General Montgomery. Air Vice Marshall Leigh Mallory, designated as the air commander for the raid, also agreed with the two Naval officers, but to no avail. The frontal assault on Dieppe was retained. A summary of the outline plan's main tactical objectives for RUTTER included:
• Destroy enemy defenses in the vicinity of Dieppe
• Destroy the aerodrome installations at St. Aubin would also consist of carrying aircraft for parachute troops, and tugs for gliders.
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In early June, two fateful modifications to the approved outline plan for RUTTER were incorporated that would stir controversy to this very day.
First, the official British Naval Staff History states:
On the 5 th of June a modification to the plan was introduced. It was decided, at a meeting between the executive of Combined Operations, the Force Commanders and General Montgomery, to abandon the high-level bombing of Dieppe on air and military grounds. The Air Force Commander was of the opinion that the bombing of the port itself during the night prior to the assault would not be the most profitable way to use bombers and might only result in putting the enemy on alert. The Military Committee took the view that the destruction of large numbers of houses and the setting of a considerable portion of the town on fire would probably prevent the tanks from operating in streets choked with debris…The bombardment was now to be limited to the 4-inch guns of six destroyers, and the 250 pound bombs of the Hurricane fighter-bombers.
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The second fateful decision was to forgo augmenting the raiding force with heavy naval gunfire "Mountbatten had asked the Admiralty for a battleship to support the raid…even if the risk had been deemed too great to imperil such major units such as HMS King George V or HMS Duke of York, lying at Gibraltar was HMS Malaya, of 1915 vintage and thus too slow (at 20 knots) for fleet operations, but still with eight 15-inch guns. Nevertheless, the response of the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound (perhaps recalling the fate of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse, while forgetting that they had been caught without any air cover at all) was unequivocal. 'A battleship in the Channel! Dicky, you must be mad!'
13
Admiral Baillie-Grohman, the Naval Task Force Commander expressed his concern as well.
"Admiral Baillie-Grohman would have liked a battleship to have been made available, but it was explained to him that one of the purposes of the raid was to provide a success-or what could be represented as a success-to hearten public opinion after the shocks it had endured in the last six months. Whatever happened, the operation could not have been represented as a success had a battleship been lost by a mine or otherwise in the confined waters off Dieppe." 
18
Changes to the JUBILEE plan first addressed the concern of secrecy, given that a large number of troops had been briefed just prior to cancellation of RUTTER and were now "at large" 
AUGUST, 1942: "A VISIT TO THE POOR MAN'S MONTE CARLO"
H-hour for the raid was set for 04:50 hours, 19 August, though due to lack of sea room and trained landing craft crews, the four flank attacks at YELLOW, BLUE, GREEN, and ORANGE beaches were to be launched half an hour ahead of the main attack, at RED and WHITE beaches.
Brigadier Churchill Mann, earlier one of the key planners and now serving as the Deputy
Commander of the raid, explained the concept as follows: (See map for assault locations by color)
On the far left, (YELLOW beach) British commandos were to destroy the gun battery at Berneval. Landing at Puys, (BLUE beach) the Royal Regiment and a company of the Black Watch were to destroy guns on the Eastern Headland overlooking Dieppe harbor. On the extreme right, (ORANGE beach) commandos were to destroy Varengeville battery. At Pourville (GREEN beach), the South Saskatchewan Regiment was to land astride the River Scie. Thirty minutes later the Cameron Highlanders would advance through the Saskatchewan's beachhead, move inland, join tanks from Dieppe and assault an airdrome (St. Aubin) and a German Divisional headquarters believed to be at Arques. There were to be two other attacks at H-hour plus 30 minutes. On the left, half of the beach at Dieppe (RED beach), the Essex Scottish and the Calgary Regiment were to land simultaneously and advance rapidly into the town to secure the harbor area for engineer demolitions. On the right half of the Dieppe beach (WHITE beach), the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (RHLI) would land with other Calgary tanks and move through the town to secure exits for other tanks to proceed inland where they could join the Camerons. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal were to land later, occupying the perimeter of the town after the Essex and the RHLI had seized it. All Canadian units were to withdraw across the main Dieppe beaches, with the Fusiliers Mont-Royal serving as rearguard.
History shows that from the beginning, the complex plan for Dieppe, which was heavily Commando with the responsibility of attacking from the rear, effectively diverted the gun crews and kept them from firing on other landing areas and ships of the fleet. Three hours after landing, the remaining commandos withdrew to the beach and boarded landing craft to make their escape. Major Peter Young, the commando leader who led the assault from the rear was later cited for bravery and is credited for taking part in one of the few successes of the day.
BLUE BEACH (PUYS)
The Royal Regiment of Canada's landing at BLUE beach, another flank attack and the most crucial to the success of the main Dieppe attack, was a bloody debacle. The first wave of the "Royals" with the critical mission of capturing the Eastern headlands with its formidable positions on top, landed 20 minutes later than planned when the effects of the smoke screens and darkness had been entirely lost. The German defenders, comprising only two platoons and some technicians, were fully alert. The local commander had countermanded the customary 'stand-down' order at dawn after hearing the naval encounter offshore. Nowhere was the fire more intense than at BLUE beach.
20
The beach area was only 200 yards wide and covered by two pill boxes and several machine gun nests. As the first wave of landing craft came in, the craft were raked with heavy fire from both sides of the beach and a gully directly ahead. A seawall afforded the only protection, however, as the ramps of the landing craft came down, troops were mowed down in large numbers. As subsequent craft came in, the beach had become a grisly scene of death and Throughout Vanquish, the naval officers conducted the withdrawal with unbelievable dash and courage. Under devastating fire, they fearlessly brought their LCA's and LCM's in to the beaches time after time to rescue the men of Second Division infantry units. Some of the craft were sunk by shell fire. Some craft were swamped, but still the navy persisted in their efforts to evacuate the maximum number despite the horrendous casualties. against Russia, and in the war as a whole."
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Operationally and tactically there were many lessons learned from Dieppe, the need for overwhelming air and naval gunfire support being the most common lesson learned. Another concept, was the creation of the J-Force, ("J" stood for JUBILEE in honor of Dieppe) a specially trained and equipped naval force, expert in amphibious warfare with emphasis on carrying troops to assault landings. The concept of artificial harbors such the "Mulberry" made its debut at Normandy, and not coincidentally, Hughes-Hallett the naval force commander at Dieppe was involved in its conception. Tactically, the list of Dieppe-inspired innovation is long, with everything from specially designed assault tanks that swim, (known as DD, for Duplex Drive) to the concept of a tactical communication center, and Forward Air Controllers.
All the key leaders involved in the Dieppe operation went on to greater deeds. 
